diff --git a/.env b/.env
index 6364b54..49e90e0 100644
--- a/.env
+++ b/.env
@@ -9,4 +9,15 @@ LINKEDIN_SECRET=ugf61aJ2iyErLK40
 USE_MOCK_AUTH=true
 
 MAX_BILL_ATTACHMENT_UPLOAD_SIZE_KB=1024
-MAX_PROOF_OF_PAYMENT_UPLOAD_SIZE_KB=1024
\ No newline at end of file
+MAX_PROOF_OF_PAYMENT_UPLOAD_SIZE_KB=1024
+
+# Share link security
+SHARE_LINK_SECRET=fb831e43b5ab594106e093f86fa8cb2a2405c564a61c3a7681079ec416528654
+
+# Share link TTL configuration
+SHARE_TTL_INITIAL_DAYS=10
+SHARE_TTL_AFTER_VISIT_HOURS=1
+
+# Rate limiting for uploads
+UPLOAD_RATE_LIMIT_PER_IP=5
+UPLOAD_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS=3600000
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/app/lib/db-types.ts b/app/lib/db-types.ts
index 341ed62..87a93ef 100644
--- a/app/lib/db-types.ts
+++ b/app/lib/db-types.ts
@@ -81,6 +81,10 @@ export interface BillingLocation {
     utilBillsProofOfPayment?: FileAttachment|null;
     /** (optional) rent proof of payment attachment */
     rentProofOfPayment?: FileAttachment|null;
+    /** (optional) share link expiry timestamp */
+    shareTTL?: Date;
+    /** (optional) when tenant first visited the share link */
+    shareFirstVisitedAt?: Date | null;
 };
 
 export enum BilledTo {
diff --git a/app/lib/shareChecksum.ts b/app/lib/shareChecksum.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..54c2eab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/shareChecksum.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+import crypto from 'crypto';
+
+/**
+ * Generate share link checksum for location
+ * Uses HMAC-SHA256 for cryptographic integrity
+ *
+ * SECURITY: Prevents location ID enumeration while allowing stateless validation
+ */
+export function generateShareChecksum(locationId: string): string {
+  const secret = process.env.SHARE_LINK_SECRET;
+
+  if (!secret) {
+    throw new Error('SHARE_LINK_SECRET environment variable not configured');
+  }
+
+  return crypto
+    .createHmac('sha256', secret)
+    .update(locationId)
+    .digest('hex')
+    .substring(0, 16); // 64 bits of entropy (sufficient for share links)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Validate share link checksum
+ * Uses constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
+ *
+ * @param locationId - The location ID from URL
+ * @param providedChecksum - The checksum from URL
+ * @returns true if checksum is valid
+ */
+export function validateShareChecksum(
+  locationId: string,
+  providedChecksum: string
+): boolean {
+  try {
+    const expectedChecksum = generateShareChecksum(locationId);
+
+    // Convert to buffers for timing-safe comparison
+    const expected = Buffer.from(expectedChecksum);
+    const provided = Buffer.from(providedChecksum);
+
+    // Length check (prevents timing attack on different lengths)
+    if (expected.length !== provided.length) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    // Constant-time comparison (prevents timing attacks)
+    return crypto.timingSafeEqual(expected, provided);
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
diff --git a/app/lib/uploadRateLimiter.ts b/app/lib/uploadRateLimiter.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..62b2ba1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/uploadRateLimiter.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/**
+ * Simple in-memory rate limiter for upload attempts
+ * Tracks by IP address
+ */
+
+interface RateLimitEntry {
+  count: number;
+  resetAt: number; // Unix timestamp
+}
+
+// In-memory store (use Redis for production multi-instance setups)
+const rateLimitStore = new Map<string, RateLimitEntry>();
+
+/**
+ * Check if IP address is rate limited
+ * @returns { allowed: boolean, remaining: number }
+ */
+export function checkUploadRateLimit(ipAddress: string): { allowed: boolean; remaining: number; resetIn: number } {
+
+  const maxUploads = parseInt(process.env.UPLOAD_RATE_LIMIT_PER_IP || '5', 10);
+  const windowMs = parseInt(process.env.UPLOAD_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS || '3600000', 10); // 1 hour
+
+  const now = Date.now();
+  const key = `upload:${ipAddress}`;
+
+  let entry = rateLimitStore.get(key);
+
+  // Clean up expired entry or create new one
+  if (!entry || now > entry.resetAt) {
+    entry = {
+      count: 0,
+      resetAt: now + windowMs
+    };
+    rateLimitStore.set(key, entry);
+  }
+
+  // Check if limit exceeded
+  if (entry.count >= maxUploads) {
+    return {
+      allowed: false,
+      remaining: 0,
+      resetIn: Math.ceil((entry.resetAt - now) / 1000) // seconds
+    };
+  }
+
+  // Increment counter
+  entry.count++;
+  rateLimitStore.set(key, entry);
+
+  return {
+    allowed: true,
+    remaining: maxUploads - entry.count,
+    resetIn: Math.ceil((entry.resetAt - now) / 1000)
+  };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Periodic cleanup of expired entries (prevent memory leak)
+ * Call this occasionally (e.g., every hour)
+ */
+export function cleanupRateLimitStore() {
+  const now = Date.now();
+  for (const [key, entry] of rateLimitStore.entries()) {
+    if (now > entry.resetAt) {
+      rateLimitStore.delete(key);
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+// Auto-cleanup every 10 minutes
+setInterval(cleanupRateLimitStore, 10 * 60 * 1000);
diff --git a/app/lib/validators/pdfValidator.ts b/app/lib/validators/pdfValidator.ts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8036c4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/app/lib/validators/pdfValidator.ts
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/**
+ * Validate that uploaded file is a legitimate PDF
+ * Checks magic bytes, not just MIME type
+ */
+export async function validatePdfFile(file: File): Promise<{ valid: boolean; error?: string }> {
+
+  // Check file size first (quick rejection)
+  const maxFileSizeKB = parseInt(process.env.MAX_PROOF_OF_PAYMENT_UPLOAD_SIZE_KB || '1024', 10);
+  const maxFileSizeBytes = maxFileSizeKB * 1024;
+
+  if (file.size === 0) {
+    return { valid: false, error: 'File is empty' };
+  }
+
+  if (file.size > maxFileSizeBytes) {
+    return { valid: false, error: `File size exceeds ${maxFileSizeKB} KB limit` };
+  }
+
+  // Read file content
+  const arrayBuffer = await file.arrayBuffer();
+  const buffer = Buffer.from(arrayBuffer);
+
+  // Check PDF magic bytes (header signature)
+  // PDF files must start with "%PDF-" (bytes: 25 50 44 46 2D)
+  const header = buffer.toString('utf-8', 0, 5);
+  if (!header.startsWith('%PDF-')) {
+    return { valid: false, error: 'Invalid PDF file format' };
+  }
+
+  // Optional: Check for PDF version (1.0 to 2.0)
+  const version = buffer.toString('utf-8', 5, 8); // e.g., "1.4", "1.7", "2.0"
+  const versionMatch = version.match(/^(\d+\.\d+)/);
+  if (!versionMatch) {
+    return { valid: false, error: 'Invalid PDF version' };
+  }
+
+  // Optional: Verify PDF EOF marker (should end with %%EOF)
+  // Note: Some PDFs have trailing data, so this is lenient
+  const endSection = buffer.toString('utf-8', Math.max(0, buffer.length - 1024));
+  if (!endSection.includes('%%EOF')) {
+    console.warn('PDF missing EOF marker - may be corrupted');
+    // Don't reject, just warn (some valid PDFs have non-standard endings)
+  }
+
+  return { valid: true };
+}